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The Borel–Kolmogorov paradox has fascinated students and researchers
since its discovery by Kolmogorov 100 years ago. Classical conditioning is
only valid with respect to events of positive probability. If we ignore this
constraint and condition on such sets, for example events of type {Y = y}
for a continuously distributed random variable Y , almost any probability
measure can be chosen as the conditional measure on such sets. There have
been numerous descriptions and explanations of the paradox’ appearance in
the setting of conditioning on a subset of probability zero. However, most
treatments don’t supply explicit instructions on how to avoid it. We propose
to close this gap by defining a version of conditional measure which utilizes
the Hausdorff measure. This makes the choice canonical in the sense that it
only depends on the geometry of the space alone, thus removing any ambi-
guity. We describe the set of possible measures arising in the context of the
Borel–Kolmogorov paradox and classify those coinciding with the canonical
measure. We also describe a setting where the canonical measure is not the
right notion, especially in the context of Bayesian inverse problems.
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1 Introduction
Imagine moving into a new house. The realtor shows you all the rooms with exception
of the attic, which he explicitly tells you not to enter because there is a lion living inside
that will attack anyone entering. Imagine being okay with that and living in that house
under this restriction. You realize, though, that you need the attic space so you carefully
work out the lion’s sleeping schedule and tiptoe in and out whenever you need to retrieve
things you have stored in its den. Usually that works out just fine and only rarely do
you lose a guest whom you have failed to inform about the avoidance protocol that you
have put in place for your safety.
The concept of conditional probability and expectation is such a lion in the house of
mathematical sciences. Its teeth (most notably its fang, the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox)
have taken countless victims. Almost everyone who has studied conditioning knows that
“you have to be careful”, especially when conditioning on singular events. There are
multiple ways in which scientists deal with that fear of conditioning. Some, similar to
our houseowner, only use conditioning in a specific way such that ambiguity cannot
arise. Others try to screen the difficulties with bigger words like “regular conditional
probability” or conditional expectation with respect to sigma-algebras (but those are
solutions for different problems and don’t have a bearing on the paradox). The pure
probabilist’s take on this issue is that it is not of interest at all because conditioning on
singular sets is a fool’s errand. Nonetheless, conditional densities which are ubiquitous
in practice are (supposedly) attempting exactly that. In the authors’ opinion there is
no accessible textbook or paper which completely solves the problem. We are trying to
close this gap.
The idea of this article is is that it should give you the necessary tools to enter the
attic anytime you want and get out alive if you follow a specific and easy set of rules.
We want to note that this manuscript can be neither written nor read from a purely
probabilistic viewpoint: Probability theory’s judgement on singular conditioning is that
you cannot do it. As this provision is not heeded by people working in the fields of
Bayesian inversion or applied statistics, we need to find a way to untangle the arising
confusion. For this we need geometrical tools, thereby leaving the domain of probability
theory. In particular, in this work we will only consider finite-dimensional probability
spaces which carry a natural metric. This is undoubtedly a long way from the generality
of the usual probability space triple, but one which practitioners will usually not find
unduly restricting for their purposes.
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There have been numerous attempts to warn of and explain the Borel–Kolmogorov
paradox. The most accessible and helpful one is [10]. It gives a good visual explanation
of the reasons for the occurence of the paradox (which we adopt here because it is very
revealing) but ultimately does not point towards a solution (thus falling into the “just
be careful” category). The original Borel–Kolmogorov paradox (with a measure on the
sphere) is also demonstrated in the well-known textbook [2], but again without any
solution on how to deal with it. The probably most ambitious opus is [12] which lays
out the fundamental derivation of conditional probability via conditional expectation,
points out all major pitfalls including the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox. It then goes on to
elaborate on Renyi’s axiomatic approach to conditional expectation but finally concludes
that this does not solve the problem either. See also [1, 9]. For visually appealing
geometric explanations and philosophical justification of the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox,
see [13].
For comments on non-standard ways of introducing conditional distributions, we also
refer to [14, 4, 5].
An interesting variation on the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox was discussed in [8]. The
authors show that there are again many plausible ways of approximating a singular set.
Their resolution is by appealing to physicality in order to single out a specific version.
More recently, [7] attempted to resolve the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox by extending an
elementary 0-1-measure defined on the singular domain on the whole probability space.
Unfortunately, their construction does not work, see the errata1. On a fundamental
level, the problem is that their proposed functional qA is not absolutely continuous with
respect to the prior.
This manuscript is not addressed at those mathematicians/statisticians who have
never had any issues with wrapping their head around the concept of conditional expec-
tation. In contrast, this is supposed to help anyone who has been troubled by conditional
probability much too long.
Plan of this paper Our article is structured in the following way: for readers yet
unaware of the lion’s fangs, we start with a brief outline of the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox
(which we generalize such that a conditional measure on a set of measure zero can be
almost anything). We then introduce the notion of canonically induced measure and
show how this singles out one of the various possible measures arising from conditioning
on a set of measure zero. A concluding section connects the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox
with the field of Bayesian inversion (or Bayesian statistics). The paradox does not
typically appear here but it pays off to exactly understand why.
1http://phil.elte.hu/gyz/counterexample.pdf
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2 Guiding example: Bayes’ theorem applied to a statistical
problem
We assume2 that there are two i.i.d. random variables X,Y ∼ N(0, 1). We interpret X
as an unknown parameter and Y as an unknown noise term. We further assume that
there is a dependent random variable Z (called “data”) defined via
Z =
Y
X
,
i.e. the data Z is a measurement of 1/X corrupted by multiplicative noise Y .
Now assume we are given a concrete measurement result Z = −1. What information
does this give us about the parameter X? Interpreted in a Bayesian way, we should take
our prior on X, which is N(0, 1) and update it with the likelihood3 P(Z = −1|X) in
order to obtain the posterior P(X|Z = −1). Now obviously, the event that we condition
on has probability zero so we have to depart from a simple application of Bayes’ law of
the form
P(X = x|Z = −1) = P(Z = −1|X = x) · P(X = x)
P(Z = −1)
because all quantities involved are singular. Hence we do what we teach our students and
substitute the singular probabilities by densities. Here, we will always write fW (w) for
the density of a continuous random variable W on R. If there are two random variables
A,B,C where C is defined via C = F (A,B) (as in the case of X,Y, Z here) we write
fC|A(c|a) = fC|A=a(c) as the density of the random variable F (a,B) (i.e. A = a is fixed
and only B accounts for randomness in the new random variable C|(A = a)).4
In our guiding example, fX(x) =
1√
2pi
exp(−x2/2) and fY has the same form. The
density of Z|(X = x) is given by the density of Y/x, which is
fZ|(X=x)(z) =
1√
2pi 1
x2
exp(−z2x2/2)
for x 6= 0 (and undefined else, but X = 0 is an event of probability 0). In order to get
the marginal distribution of Z, we need to integrate over the density of X, which, after
some calculation, yields fZ(z) =
1
pi(1+z2)
(unsurprisingly, because this is the density of a
Cauchy distribution, which is the result of taking the fraction of two standard Gaussian
random variables).
The version of Bayes’ theorem for densities now yields
fX|Z(x|z) =
fZ|X(z|x) · fX(x)
fZ(z)
=
|x|√
2pi
exp(−z2x2/2) · 1√
2pi
exp(−x2/2)
1
pi(1+z2)
2This example is from [10] and is similar to an earlier computation in [11]
3for now, we will formally write things like P(Z = −1) in order to describe the setting more clearly. Of
course we have to substitute this with the density of Z etc., but this will come later.
4We don’t further formalize this approach here because it is such a standard method in any text-
book about dependent continuous random variables and because we want to show how this leads to
problems.
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and in particular
fX|(Z=−1)(x) = fX|Z(x| − 1) = |x| · exp(−x2).
A different approach If this calculation is deemed too tedious, one can alternatively
utilize that Z = −1 is equivalent to X+Y = 0 and define another random variable W =
X+Y . Then {Z = −1} = {W = 0} (this is correct) and we can equivalently condition on
(W = 0) (this is incorrect, and this is where we lose an arm to the lion because we were
not cautious enough). Now, calculations are easier: fW |X(w|x) = 1√2pi exp(−(w−x)2/2)
and fW (w) =
1√
4pi
exp(−w2/4). This even follows without marginalizing and is due to
W = N(0, 2) as a sum of two i.i.d. standard random variables. Then again,
fX|W (x|w) =
fW |X(W |x) · fX(x)
fW (w)
=
1√
2pi
exp(−(w − x)2/2) · 1√
2pi
exp(−x2/2)
1√
4pi
exp(−w2/4)
and
fX|W=0(x) = fX|W (x|0) =
1√
pi
exp(−x2),
i.e. X|(W = 0) is a N(0, 1/√2) random variable.
Now, although clearly {Z = −1} = {W = 0}, the conditional densities of X con-
ditioned to either event are completely different (most notably: the former approach
assigns very small posterior probability to intervals centered at x = 0 whereas the latter
approach identifies x = 0 as the point of highest probability density), as figure 1 shows.
3 2 1 0 1 2 3
0.0
0.2
0.4
fX|Z = 1
fX|W = 0
Figure 1: Conditional densities fX|Z=−1 and fX|W=0.
More pointedly we can say the following: Given X,Y,W,Z as above, the events {W =
0} and {Z = −1} are equivalent (i.e. they differ only on a set of zero measure5), but
our updated belief about X given one of those events, i.e. the distributions X|{W = 0}
and X|{Z = −1} differ strongly. In particular, the former identifies X = 0 as the point
of highest probability density. The latter says the opposite.
We can produce a countless number of different results by e.g. defining R := (X +
Y ) · exp((X − Y )2) and conditioning on R = 0.
5Note that the fact that Z is not defined for X = 0 is not relevant for the occurrence of this paradox.
5
We call this the (extended) Borel–Kolmogorov paradox: The original paradox was
formulated for a uniform measure on the sphere with a specific parametrization via
spherical coordinates. There, the conditional measure on the equator is different from
the conditional measure on the “Greenwich meridian”, which is paradoxical as both sets
equivalent to each other via rotation. For a discussion see for example [2]. But as the
manifold setting needlessly complicates the mathematics (obfuscating the real issue) and
the same problems lead to the same paradox in flat space, we will stick with Euclidean
setting here, with the generalization to manifolds being a cumbersome corollary (not
included in this manuscript).
When does the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox happen and how can we avoid it? In
brevity, the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox arises when one wants to condition on a set of
zero measure but uses different parametrizations of this subset via random variables.
It is not directly relevant in the case where we are interested in directly conditioning
on a singular event of the form W = w for some random variable W and value w.
One (pragmatic) approach to avoiding it is to always specify the parametrization, i.e.
don’t ask for “what is the distribution of X given X = Y ?”, but rather “What is the
distribution of X given W = 0 for W := X − Y ?”.
In this manuscript we argue that there is a “canonical” choice of conditional measure
on the subset without the need for additional random variables, if the probability space is
Euclidean (and thus carries a metric). We will call this the canonically induced measure
and it is purely defined via the metric of the probability space and the underlying
probability measure. We will then specify the class of parametrizations of the subset we
condition on which recover the canonically induced measure.
3 Defining measures on a subset of lower dimension
We will define two notions of measures on a submanifold. The first notion we will call
the “canonically induced measure”. This is completely independent of any charts that
are used in the definition of the manifold. We argue that this is the “correct” (or at
least a canonical) way of defining a measure which is induced on a lower dimensional
structure embedded in the probability space. The second notion is a chart-dependent
definition. As a given manifold can be described by various charts, there is not a unique
way of doing that. We will show when and how those two notions coincide and we will
argue that the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox happens when we compare instances of the
second notion with different charts. Our proposed resolution of the paradox is to always
use the version generated by the canonically induced measure, unless one is explicitly
interested in a specific parametrization given by a random variable, see section 4.
3.1 Canonically induced measure
Definition 1 (Canonically induced measure). Let µ be an absolutely continuous prob-
ability measure on (Rn,B(Rn)) with lower semicontinuous non-negative density fµ, and
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M ⊂ Rn be a r-rectifiable set with Hr(M) > 0 (this is in particular true if M is a smooth
submanifold of dimension r), where 0 ≤ r ≤ n. Then we define a functional on subsets
A ⊂M by setting
µM (A) :=
∫
A fµ dHr∫
M fµ dHr
, (1)
where Hr denotes the r-dimensional Hausdorff measure. We call this measure the canon-
ically induced measure on M , and “canonical”, because it is essentially defined via the
natural metric given by the Euclidean distance.
Remark 1. Obviously, the measure µM is a generalization of the measure µ since by
choosing for r = n it holds that µRn = µ.
Remark 2. Note that the definition of µM mirrors in a very natural way the definition
of conditional probability in the non-singular case, i.e. µ(D1|D2) := µ(D1∩D2)µ(D2) for a
probability measure µ and µ(D2) > 0. The Hausdorff measure allows us to bypass the
issue of “0/0”.
For this reason, we will also interpret µM as the “canonical” conditional probability
of A given M , or
µ(A|M) = µM (A).
Figure 2: Visualization of the fan measure: µΦ,s(A) is the limit superior of the ratio of
the areas enclosed between “fans” of values s± ε.
The measure µM inherits being a metric outer measure from the Hausdorff measure.
Lemma 1. µM : P(M)→ [0, 1] is a metric outer measure.
Next, we define a chart-dependent measure which usually differs from µM but is used
implicitly every time we condition on a random variable. This is a favourable approach
in practice because it can be computed in practice. This ease of application comes with
the ambiguity at the heart of the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox.
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3.2 Fan measure
(Ω,A,P)
(Rn,B(Rn), µ) (Rn,As, µΦ,s)
(Rm,B(Rm),Φ#µ)
X
Φ Φ−1({s} × ·)
Figure 3: Spaces and maps involved in the definition of the trace σ-algebra As and fan
measure µΦ,s from Definition 2
Let (Rn,B(Rn), µ) be a probability space and X a random variable on some abstract
probability space (Ω,A,P) with values in Rn such that µ is the law of X, meaning
P(X ∈ C) = µ(C).
We start by defining a way of interpreting conditioning as “looking at a submanifold”:
to this end we consider the function
Φ : Rn → Rm, x 7→
(
ϕ(x)
ψ(x)
)
,
where ϕ : Rn → Rk and ψ : Rn → Rm−k, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m−1}, are continuous functions.
We define a family of n− k-dimensional submanifolds of Rn by looking at the level sets
of ϕ:
M s := {x ∈ Rn : ϕ(x) = s},
where s ∈ Rk.
We assume that µ(
⋃
s∈SM
s) = 1 for some parameter set S. The family can be thought
of as fanning out the whole space (up to sets of measure 0).
Definition 2 (Fan measure). Let µ be a strictly positive measure on Rn, meaning that
µ(A) > 0 for every open set A ⊂ Rn. Furthermore, we define M s = Φ−1({s} × Rm−k)
and the associated trace σ-algebra
As := M s ∩ ψ−1(B(Rm−k)) = Φ−1({s} × B(Rm−k)). (2)
Then for A = Φ−1({s} ×B) ∈ As we define
µΦ,s(A) := lim sup
ε↘0
Φ#µ(Bε(s)×B)
Φ#µ(Bε(s)× Rm−k) , (3)
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where Φ#µ := µ ◦ Φ−1 is the push-forward measure of µ under Φ and Bε(s) := {x ∈
Rk : |x − s| < ε} denotes the open ball around s ∈ Rk with radius ε > 0. For brevity,
we will call µΦ,s the fan measure associated to Φ (because the mapping Φ fans out the
whole space and each submanifold is one fold of the fan).
We will now see that the fan measure exactly corresponds to the usual notion of
conditional distribution (under relatively mild assumptions on the random variables
involved). Consider an abstract probability space (Ω,A,P), a random variable V : Ω→
R with density fV , and a random vector U : Ω→ Rm−1 with joint density fU,V : Rm → R.
For simplicity we assume that the densities are continuous and that fZ is strictly positive.
For a < b, we can without ambiguity calculate the probability
P(U ∈ B|V ∈ (a, b)) =
(∫ b
a
∫
B
fU,V (u, v) dudv
)
/
(∫ b
a
fV (v) dv
)
.
To condition on V = s one usually employs the singular limit (if it exists)
P(U ∈ B|V = s) := lim sup
ε↘0
P(U ∈ B|V ∈ (s− ε, s+ ε)). (4)
If one uses the densities fU,V and fV one can use this definition to calculate the condi-
tional density using the Lebesgue-Besicovich differentiation theorem (or the fundamental
theorem of calculus):
P(U ∈ B|V = s) = lim sup
ε↘0
P(U ∈ B|V ∈ (s− ε, s+ ε))
= lim sup
ε↘0
∫ s+ε
s−ε
∫
B fU,V (u, v) dudv∫ s+ε
s−ε fV (v) dv
= lim
ε↘0
1
2ε
∫ s+ε
s−ε
∫
B fU,V (u, v) dudv
1
2ε
∫ s+ε
s−ε fV (v) dv
=
∫
B fU,V (u, s) du
fV (s)
Thus, the conditional density of U given V = s for some s ∈ R is defined as
fU |V=s(u) =
fU,V (u, v)
fV (s)
. (5)
This is the way one usually defines conditional densities (see for example section 1.4 in
[12]).
Now we can see that the fan measure corresponding to fans of co-dimension one is
directly related to conditioning a random variable on a subset of measure zero:
Lemma 2. Let X : (Ω,A,P) → (Rn,B(Rn)) be a random variable with law µ, i.e.
P(X ∈ C) = µ(C). Define the random variable Z := ϕ(X) and the random vector W :=
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ψ(X) (i.e. (Z,W ) = Φ(X)) for continuous mappings ϕ : Rn → R and ψ : Rn → Rm−1,
and write Φ = (ϕ,ψ).
Then, for A := Φ−1({s} ×B) ∈ As it holds
µΦ,s(A) = P(W ∈ B|Z = s),
where µΦ,s is as in Definition 2 for k = 1 and P(W ∈ B|Z = s) is defined by (4).
Proof. Since µ is a strictly positive measure and ϕ is continuous, it holds for any open
interval I ⊂ R
P(Z ∈ I) = P(ϕ(X) ∈ I) = P(X ∈ ϕ−1(I)) = µ(ϕ−1(I)) > 0.
Hence, we can use the definition of the conditional probability to obtain
P(W ∈ B|Z = s) = lim sup
ε↘0
P(W ∈ B|Z ∈ (s− ε, s+ ε))
= lim sup
ε↘0
P(W ∈ B, Z ∈ (s− ε, s+ ε))
P(Z ∈ (s− ε, s+ ε))
= lim sup
ε↘0
Φ#µ((s− ε, s+ ε)×B)
Φ#µ((s− ε, s+ ε)× Rm−1)
= µΦ,s(A),
where in the last step we utilized that Bε(s) = (s− ε, s+ ε) in dimension k = 1.
Corollary 1. The fan measure (3) for k = 1 is a probability measure if and only if the
singular conditional probability (4) is. This is the case, for instance, if the latter has the
conditional density (5).
More concretely, this means that different fan measures on a manifold M correspond
to using different (artifical) random variables to condition on this manifold. This is
the reason for the ambiguity in the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox: There is no a-priori
canonical random variable which we need to condition on in order to obtain the “correct”
restriction on M .
On the other hand, the canonically induced measure is defined without additional
random variables and in a way that only uses the metric of the space (incorporated
through the Hausdorff measure). For this reason, it is interesting to investigate which
fan measures yield the same measure as the canonical measure.
3.3 Conditions for equivalence of canonical and fan measure
Theorem 1 (Equality of canonical and fan measure). Let A = Φ−1({s} × B) ∈ As for
some s ∈ Rk and some set B ⊂ B(Rm−k). Denote Jϕ(x) :=
√
det(Dϕ(x)Dϕ(x)T ), x ∈
Ω, and assume that
• there exists a constant C > 0 such that Jϕ ≡ C on M s,
10
• there exists a constant 0 < r ≤ C and an open neighborhood U of M s such that
Jϕ ≥ r on U ,
• Jϕ ∈ C1 on U .
Then it holds for almost all s ∈ Rk
µΦ,s(A) = µMs(A). (6)
Proof. We recall the coarea formula [6]∫
Rn
g(x)Jα(x) dx =
∫
Rk
∫
α−1(t)
g(x) dHn−k(x) dt
for functions α : Rn → Rk and g : Rn → R where Jα(x) =
√
det(Dα(x)Dα(x)T ). Using
this formula with α = ϕ and g = χΦ−1(Bε(s)×B)fµ we obtain∫
Φ−1(Bε(s)×B)
Jϕ(x)fµ(x) dx =
∫
Bε(s)
∫
Φ−1({t}×B)
fµ(x) dHn−1(x) dt. (7)
Let us choose ε > 0 small enough such that Φ−1(Bε(s) × B) ⊂ U . Then we can
use that Jϕ is continuously differentiable to obtain Jϕ(x) = C + o(dist(x,M s)) for
x ∈ Φ−1(Bε(s)×B). To estimate dist(x,M s) we study the gradient flow
z˙(t) = −Dϕ(z(t))
Jϕ(z(t))2
sign(ϕ(z(t))− s), z(0) = x,
which is well-defined since Jϕ ≥ r > 0 on U . Here we used the notation
sign : Rk → Rk, sign(x) =
{
x
|x| , x 6= 0
0, x = 0.
Along the solution z(t) it holds by the chain rule:
d
dt
ϕ(z(t)) = − sign(ϕ(z(t))− s).
Hence, the curve η(t) := ϕ(z(t))−s solves the gradient flow of the Euclidean norm in Rk,
given by
d
dt
η(t) = − sign(η(t)), η(0) = ϕ(x)− s.
This flow has an explicit solution (cf. [3]) given by
η(t) = max(1− λt, 0) η(0), λ = 1|η(0)| ,
which becomes extinct at time
T := 1/λ = |η(0)| = |ϕ(x)− s|.
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Hence, it holds η(T ) = 0 which is equivalent to ϕ(z(T )) = s and y := z(T ) ∈M s. Note
furthermore that T meets 0 < T < ε. We compute
|x− y| = |z(0)− z(T )| ≤
∫ T
0
1
Jϕ(z(s))
ds ≤ T
r
<
ε
r
.
This shows that o(dist(x,M s)) = o(ε) and hence by using Jϕ(x) = C + o(ε) in (7) we
obtain
C · Φ#µ(Bε(s)×B) =
∫
Bε(s)
∫
Φ−1({t}×B)
fµ(x) dHn−k(x) dt+ o(ε).
Using this identity also for B = Rm−k and cancelling the factor C > 0 yields
µΦ,s(A) = lim
ε↘0
Φ#µ(Bε(s)×B)
Φ#µ(Bε(s)× Rm−k)
= lim
ε↘0
∫
Bε(s)
∫
Φ−1({t}×B) fµ(x) dHn−k(x) dt+ o(ε)∫
Bε(s)
∫
Φ−1({t}×Rm−k) fµ(x) dHn−k(x) dt+ o(ε)
= lim
ε↘0
1
|Bε(s)|
∫
Bε(s)
∫
Φ−1({t}×B) fµ(x) dHn−k(x) dt
1
|Bε(s)|
∫
Bε(s)
∫
Φ−1({t}×Rm−k) fµ(x) dHn−k(x) dt
.
Now we observe that Φ−1({t} × B) = ϕ−1{t} ∩ ψ−1B is the intersection of a level set
and a measurable set. Hence, thanks to [6, Lemma 3.5], the function
t 7→
∫
Φ−1({t}×B)
fµ(x) dHn−k(x)
is Lebesgue measurable. This allows us to use the Lebesgue differentiation theorem to
obtain for almost all s ∈ Rk:
µΦ,s(A) =
∫
Φ−1({s}×B) fµ(x) dHn−k(x)∫
Φ−1({s}×Rm−k) fµ(x) dHn−k(x)
= µMs(A).
3.4 The fan measure if the transformation mapping is a diffeomorphism
In practice, the transformation used often is a diffeomorphism. In the guiding example,
the two choices correspond to Φ(x) = (x2/x1, x1) and Φ(x) = (x1 +x2, x1), respectively.
In this case calculations are a lot easier. We can relax this to Φ being a diffeomorphism
“almost everywhere”, in the following sense:
Assumption 1. We assume that m = n and there is a set S ⊂ Rn with full measure
µ(S) = 1 such that Φ : S → Φ(S) ⊂ Rn is differentiable and invertible such that
Φ−1 : Φ(S)→ S is differentiable as well.
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Remark 3. Examples for such almost everywhere diffeomorphisms (in addition to the
guiding example) include polar coordinates on R2 if µ is absolutely continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue measure: The “stitches” of the polar coordinates where the
coordinate transform is not invertible is a set of measure 0.
In this case, we can explicitly calculate the fan measure by a integral transformation.
Take again a measurable set A = Φ−1({s} ×B), then
µΦ,s(A) = lim
ε→0
1
|Bε(s)|
∫
Bε(s)
∫
B fµ(Φ
−1(t, u)) · | det JΦ−1(t, u)|dudt
1
|Bε(s)|
∫
Bε(s)
∫
Rn−k fµ(Φ
−1(t, u)) · | det JΦ−1(t, u)|dudt
=
∫
B fµ(Φ
−1(s, u)) · | det JΦ−1(s, u)|du∫
Rn−k fµ(Φ
−1(s, u)) · | det JΦ−1(s, u)|du. (8)
This means that the fan measure has a “surface integral density” which is weighted
by the determinant term from the transformation mapping Φ. As different choice of Φ
correspond to different weightings, this immediately shows that the Borel–Kolmogorov
paradox must appear.
Example: Nonlinear Shearing Consider cartesian coordinates x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈
Rn and define
Φ(x) =

ϕ(x)
x2
...
xn

This is, for example, the setting of the guiding example and the choices of parametriza-
tions considered. Assume that assumption 1 holds. The inverse mapping is of the form
Φ−1(y) = (χ(y), y2, . . . , yn) and
JΦ−1(y) =

∂χ
∂y1
(y) ∂χ∂y2 (y)
∂χ
∂y3
(y) · · · ∂χ∂yn
0 1 0 · · · 0
0 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 1

and thus det JΦ−1(y) = ∂χ∂y1 (y). We can obtain information about χ by applying the
implicit function theorem: In order to have Φ(Φ−1(y)) = y, we need to have y1 =
ϕ(χ(y), y2, . . . , yn) for all y ∈ Rn.
In order to now leverage the implicit function theorem, we look at the function
f(y, w) = ϕ(w, y2, . . . , yn)− y1 and we are interested in the case f(y, w) = 0.
Consider any point y in the set Φ(M) where Φ−1 is a diffeomorphism. In particular,
∂ϕ
∂x1
(Φ−1(y)) 6= 0. The implicit function theorem yields the existence of a mapping χ
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such that f(y, χ(y)) = 0 in a neighborhood of y and that
∂χ
∂y1
(y) =
(
− ∂f
∂w
(y, χ(y))
)−1
·
(
∂f
∂y1
(y, χ(y))
)
=
(
∂ϕ
∂x1
(χ(y), y2, . . . , yn)
)−1
=
(
∂ϕ
∂x1
(Φ−1(y))
)−1
Hence,
|det JΦ−1(y)| =
∣∣∣∣ ∂ϕ∂x1 (Φ−1(y))
∣∣∣∣−1 .
Returning to our characterization (8) of the fan measure:
µΦ,s(A) =
∫
B fµ(Φ
−1(s, u)) · | det JΦ−1(s, u)|du∫
Rn−1 fµ(Φ
−1(s, u)) · | det JΦ−1(s, u)|du
=
∫
B fµ(Φ
−1(s, u)) ·
∣∣∣ ∂ϕ∂x1 (Φ−1(s, u))∣∣∣−1 du∫
Rn−1 fµ(Φ
−1(s, u)) ·
∣∣∣ ∂ϕ∂x1 (Φ−1(s, u))∣∣∣−1 du
We can see that we could have resolved the apparent paradox in the guiding example
by this approach as well: The two different parametrizations correspond to a choice of
ϕ(x1, x2) = x2/x1 and ϕ(x1, x2) = x1 + x2, respectively. The first option directly yields
the additional factor of |u| in the resulting density, whereas the second one coincides
with the canonically induced submeasure since Dϕ is constant.
Example: Polar coordinates in 2d We consider cartesian coordinates (x1, x2) ∈ R2
and the coordinate transformation x1 = y1 cos(y2), x2 = y2 sin(y2) where we (differing
from convention) set y1 ∈ R (instead of R+) and y2 ∈ (0, pi). The mappings are
Φ(x) =
sign(x2) ·√x21 + x22
arccos
(
x1√
x21+x
2
2
)  = (ϕ(x)
ψ(x)
)
Φ−1(y) =
(
y1 cos y2
y1 sin y2
)
with | det(JΦ−1(y))| = |y1|. If X is a random variable on R2 with density f , then
Y = Φ(X) has density g(y) = f(y1 cos y2, y1 sin y2) · |y1|.
We first consider the sphere of radius s in two dimensions M s := {x ∈ R2 : |x| =
s} = {x : ϕ(x) = s}. It is easily seen that |Dϕ(x)| = 1 for x ∈ M s (this is due
to the fact that concentrical spheres have constant distance to each other everywhere),
hence theorem 1 states that the canonically induced measure µMs coincides with the
chart dependent measure µΦ,s. This in turn (according to lemma 2) is the same as the
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Figure 4: M s is uniformly approximated by rings of vanishing thickness.
conditional distribution of W = ψ(X) (the polar angle) given by ϕ(X) = s (the radius),
and is given by
µΦ,s(Φ
−1({s} ×B)) = 1
Cs
∫
B
f(s · cosu, s sinu) du,
with a suitable constant Cs > 0 (cf. (8)). If, for example, X ∼ N(0, 1) ⊗N(0, 1), then
this is the uniform measure on the sphere with radius s.
If, on the other hand, we are interested in the subset N s := {x ∈ R2 : x2 = s · x1} (a
straight line through the origin), then things turn out differently: For convenience we
switch the order of the coordinates, i.e.
Φ(x) =
 arccos( x1√x21+x22
)
sign(x2) ·
√
x21 + x
2
2

such that N s = {x ∈ R2 : ϕ(x) = arccos sign(x1)√
1+s2
}. Then Dϕ does not have constant norm
on N s and the conditional measure induced by ϕ = s is not the canonical measure: In
particular,
µΦ,s(Φ
−1({s} ×B)) = 1
Cs
∫
B
f(u · cos s, u sin s)|u|du.
15
Figure 5: N s is (non-uniformly) approximated by cones of vanishing angle. This means
that points far away from the origin are weighted more strongly because of the
wide opening of the approximating cone. This is the significance of the factor
|u| in the conditional measure.
4 Practical considerations on dealing with singular conditional
probabilities
The initial promise of this manuscript was to give the reader a clearer idea of how to
handle and/or avoid being bit by the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox. From the discussion
so far we propose the following.
4.1 Conditioning on a set versus conditioning on a random variable
Let’s assume that we want to condition on a singular set. The first question the reader
has to answer for themselves is, “Do I want to condition on a singular set or on a singular
event given by a random variable?”.
In the concrete example of section 2, this means finding out whether we are interested
in
1. the distribution of X on the singular set {(x1, x2) : x1 + x2 = 0} or
2. the distribution of X given V = c from some random variable V and c ∈ R (with
e.g. V = W or V = Z).
In the first case, we propose to use the canonically induced measure. This can either
be computed by definition (but the Hausdorff measure is notoriously difficult to handle
explicitly) or by choosing a specific parametrization via a random variable for which
the conditions of theorem 1 hold. Then the fan measure (i.e. the “vanilla conditional
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distribution” due to lemma 2) can be computed and will correspond to the canonically
induced measure.
In the second case, one should ignore the canonically induced measure and stick with
the parametrization induced by the random variable V (a more thorough motivation for
that will be given in the next section).
4.2 The relevance of the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox for Bayesian inverse
problems
The Borel–Kolmogorov paradox only arises when we condition on subsets instead of
random variables. This is also called the equivalent events fallacy, because it makes a
big difference what random variables we use to represent a given event.
On one hand, the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox is not directly related to Bayesian inverse
problems: Bayes’ theorem always gives us a unique answer: Just condition on the random
variable which is measured. We do not have an abstract geometric subset, but a specific
random variable to condition to, so there is no real danger that we can do something
else and get a different result.
But, the similarity between those settings is too large to ignore and it pays off to take
a Bayesian inverse problem and try to break things (in a manner similar to the Borel–
Kolmogorov paradox) in order to learn what can go wrong. It turns out that there is at
least some amount of caution needed in order to keep the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox at
bay.
We consider again the example from section 2 (which can easily be posed in the
language of a Bayesian inverse problem): Set cartesian coordinates (x1, x2) ∈ R2 and a
random variable X = (X1, X2) ∈ R2 in this space with a density f . We assume that
we are interested in conditioning the random variable X on the set M := {(x1, x2) :
x1 + x2 = 0} = {(x1, x2) : x2/x1 = −1}. These two representations are of course
equivalent, but lead to different conditional measures on M , as we saw in section 2.
The canonically induced measure is (abstractly) defined as in definition 1 but it is not
straightforwardly computed, so in practice we condition on another random variable.
In section 2 we compared two different conditioning procedures: We defined (Z, X˜) :=
Φ1(X1, X2) := (
X2
X1
, X1), and (W, X˜) := Φ2(X1, X2) := (X1 + X2, X1). Then M could
be identified with the singular events {Z = −1} and {W = 0}. Up to this point nothing
goes wrong. The paradox arises as soon as we use those random variables for an implicit
transformation of the probability space. Lemma 2 shows that the distribution of X˜ = X1
given Z = −1 is the measure µΦ1,−1 and the distribution of X˜ = X1 given W = 0 is the
measure µΦ2,0.
It is easily calculated that |det(JΦ−11 (y))| = |y2| and det(JΦ−12 (y))| = 1. Theorem 1
implies that µΦ2,0 is the canonically induced measure, whereas µΦ1,−1 is not.
Stated differently, between those two options, only conditioning on W = 0 yields
the correct conditional measure (if one accepts the canonically induced measure as the
correct conditional measure on the submanifold M).
Graphically, we can also make sense of this statement. We define M s := {x ∈ R2 :
Φ1(x) = s} and N s := {x ∈ R2 : Φ2(x) = s}. Then M = M−1 = N0.
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Figure 6:
The characterization M s implies approximation by cones of vanishing angle (and thus
a non-uniform approximation). This is due to the fact that cones do not have constant
distance from each other. The characterization N s approximates by “concentric” tubes
of vanishing width and thus approximates uniformly.
Now what does this mean? This seems to suggest that although the data is given by
Z =
X2
X1
= −1,
we “need” to forget the physical measurement Z and instead condition on the completely
synthetic and non-existent W = X1 +X2 = 0 in order to get a result in accordance with
the notion of “canonical conditional probability” on the event M . This seems strange
and even wrong and will make you without doubt wonder how canonical µM really is.
Let’s consider two seemingly similar cases:
A) Let X = (X1, X2) be a N(0, 1)⊗N(0, 1) random variable. What is the distribution
of X1 given that X1 = −X2?
B) Let X1 ∼ N(0, 1) be a parameter and X2 ∼ N(0, 1) be a noise vector. What is the
distribution of X1 given we measure Z =
X2
X1
to be Z = −1?
Case A is clearly a situation where we can apply our notion of canonical conditional
distribution (because we condition on a set) and our calculation above suggests that the
correct conditional distribution of X1 is the “usual” version given by X1|(W = 0) with
W = X1 +X2.
Case B differs only in the interpretation of the quantities involved: X1, X2 and W are
given more clear meaning. In particular, we do not condition on a geometric set (like
{(x1, x2) : x1 = −x2}), but on a measurement event. And this makes all the difference.
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Indeed, the correct notion of conditional probability in this case is the version con-
ditioned on Z = −1, in contrast to what the preceding calculation suggests. The is-
sue here is the following: The set-up as given above starts with the probability space
(R2,B(R2), µ = µ0 ⊗ γ) (on the coordinates X1 and X2) where µ0 is the prior measure
on X1, γ is the “noise” measure on X2, if we interpret X1 as a parameter and X2 as a
noise term. In particular, the two variables are independent.
In case A, this constitutes the canonical choice for the fundamental probability space:
Z (and W , if it is defined) are only artificial quantities, but X1 and X2 are the funda-
mental variables with respect to which µ is defined.
In case B, the Bayesian inverse problem, things are different: We argue that the correct
tuple with respect to which we need to construct the fundamental probability space is
(X1, Z). Why is that? A measurement process is never exact, even without measurement
noise, because someone has to read off the measurement number: If we take an analog
thermometer and we try to read off the temperature, we will look for labeled tick marks
above and below and either settle for one of those or take some average. Similar with
measuring length, weight, speed, etc. Digital measurements work similarly (by cutting
off to a number which can be represented by the computer or digital measurement
device). In other words, a measurement in the context of a Bayesian inverse problem
is never actually Z = −1, but rather Z ∈ [zk, zk+1] with zk ≤ −1 ≤ zk+1 and with
|zk+1 − zk| =  a read-off (or digitalisation) uncertainty.
To simplify things, let’s write this as Z ∈ (−1 − /2,−1 + /2) (although the actual
“measurement interval” does not need to be symmetric around −1). This means, that
originally, Z ∈ (−1− /2,−1 + /2) is the correct subset to condition on. This shows us
how conditioning X1 on the singular case Z = −1 should arise as a limit of conditioning
X1 on the nonsingular case: From the reasoning in the proof of lemma 2 we see that
this corresponds to the usual conditional probability distribution X1|(Z = −1). If
we start with the probability space (R2,B(R2), µ = µ0 ⊗ γ), then we obtain Z only
via transformation Z = ϕ(X1, X2) =
X2
X1
and this leads to the apparent contradiction
between canonical conditional probability and “what we actually want”.
In contrast to the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox, where there is no real notion of “in-
teresting” coordinates, here we have more structure: While there are two degrees of
freedom, there are three dependent variables: The parameter X1, the noise X2 and the
data Z. The probability space can be fully defined by any subset of size two of those
variables. When we choose (X1, Z) as the elementary coordinates of the probability
space, and the probability measure on those variables given by the push-forward of µ
via the mapping Φ (in the sense of section 3), then the apparent contradiction vanishes:
The customary conditional probability (i.e. plain conditioning to the random variable
Z) coincides with the canonical conditional probability distribution, because there is no
additional transformation map (we condition on the second coordinate).
In order to obtain a non-overdetermined description, we have to choose a pair of
random variables out of the triple (X1, X2, Z) and use this coordinate description to
define the set we want to condition on, i.e. M = {Z = z}. If we choose (X1, X2),
we get a measure which is independent in its coordinates (because prior and noise are
usually assumed to be independent), but then the canonical measure on M does not
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correspond to the classical conditional measure given Z = z. On the other hand, if we
choose (X1, Z), then the canonical measure on M is identical to the classical conditional
measure.
As a quick synopsis of this section we give the following lemma that describes how to
reconcile Bayesian inverse problems with the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox.
Lemma 3 (Bayesian inverse problems and the Borel–Kolmogorov paradox). Consider a
Bayesian inverse problem of recovering an unknown vector X1 3 X1 ∼ µX1 (where µX1
is the prior measure on X1, i.e. the law of X1) from a known measurement
Z 3 Z = G(X1, X2)
with independent noise X2 3 X2 ∼ µX2. The product measure is defined as ν := µX1 ⊗
µX2. Then ν and G define a probability space Y = (X1×Z, σ(X1×Z), µ) where µ is the
push-forward measure µ(C) = Gˆ#ν(C) with Gˆ(x1, x2) = (x1, G(x1, x2)).
For concreteness, we say that the known measurement of Z is given by s. We define
M := {(x1, z) ∈ Y : z = s}.
In this probability space Y, the posterior probability distribution of X1|Z = s with
density fX1|Z=s(x1) :=
fX1,Z(x1,s)
fZ(s)
coincides with the canonically induced measure µM .
Proof. Define ϕ(x1, z) = z and ψ(x1, z) = x1, then the set M is also described by
ϕ−1({s}). Then the fan measure µΦ,s is plain conditioning to the second component and
thus corresponds to the usual conditional measure with density fX1|Z=s(x1) according
to lemma 2. On the other hand, ∇ϕ ≡ 1 on M , and thus by theorem 1, it is identical to
the canonical measure µM .
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